(2015/11/11) (CHLR) Mutual Funds' Reputation for Information Superiority

Published£º2015-11-06    Source£º   Views£º

Title: Mutual Funds' Reputation for Information Superiority.

Speaker: Xi Weng Abstract: We study effects of mutual funds' reputation for information superiority. Funds endoge-nously invest in
reputations by acquiring information, so they don't have exogenous types.A star rating equilibrium exists in which investors' beliefs are consistent with a discrete rat-ing system. In an equilibrium, uninformed funds within a rating group acquire informationless as they are ranked higher, leading to an "intra-group catch-up" effect. Cross rating groups, however, funds' incentives jump. Rational investors may merely rely on ratings topick funds. We relates funds' activeness to their past and future performance, and providesrational explanations to empirical observations about Morningstar Ratings.
About Xi Weng: Assistant Professor ,Department of Applied Economics, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University                         

Date: Nov,11th, 2015

Time: 13:30-14:50 PM

Location: Room 608, Academic Hall, CUFE